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Legal insanity is a peculiar element of criminal law, because it brings together two very 
different disciplines: psychiatry and psychology on the one hand and the law on the other. 
One of the basic questions regarding evaluations of defendants concerns the question 
of who should establish “true mental disorder,” the judge or the behavioral expert? This 
question is complicated, and in this contribution it will be explored based on a Dutch 
case that was eventually decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
We will argue that the ECtHR provides a valuable legal framework. Based on its merits, 
the framework could also be of interest to countries outside the Court’s jurisdiction.
Keywords: legal insanity, mental disorder, forensic psychiatric evaluation, behavioral experts, european Court of 
Human rights
introdUCtion
In many legal systems, a person who commits an offense can be held criminally liable. Criminal 
liability is based on the assumption that the offender is to blame for his criminal behavior because 
he had freedom of action and the possibility not to break the law. Reversely, a very prominent 
principle of criminal law is that a person cannot be punished for an offense if he is not to blame 
for what he did: no punishment without blame (nulla poena sine culpa). Usually, it is considered 
as an exception not to hold a person criminally responsible if he committed an offense (1–3). This 
exceptional circumstance may be rooted in a mental disorder which influenced the perpetration 
of the crime in such a way that the judge cannot hold the offender liable. In fact, there are very 
different ways of substantiating insanity in domestic criminal law systems (2).
In many legal systems, legal insanity is a defense which has to be raised by the defendant. For 
instance, in most states in the US, insanity is a defense.1 If the defense is raised by the defendant 
himself, he is very likely to cooperate with a behavioral evaluation. Meanwhile, in other systems, 
insanity assessments may be court ordered, or ordered by the prosecution. In such jurisdictions, it is 
much less clear that the defendant will cooperate with the evaluation. The Netherlands is a system in 
which behavioral evaluations—which may lead to the assessment of insanity—are, in the standard 
situation, ordered by the prosecution or the judge (5). We discuss a case in which the evaluation 
was ordered by a Court and in which the defendant refused to cooperate. Even though neither 
1 In jurisdictions in which legal insanity is a defense that has to be raised by the defendant, it may still be possible that the defense 
is, under certain circumstances, imposed (4). This possibility will not be further considered in this paper.
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the psychiatrist nor the psychologist could establish a diagnosis, 
the Court nevertheless decided that the defendant was suffering 
from a mental illness and his criminal responsibility was therefore 
considered diminished. Moreover, he was sentenced to a hospital 
order (TBS; forensic psychiatric care, see below). The decision 
was appealed, and, eventually, the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) decided about the case (47 member states fall 
under the Court’s jurisdiction).
The question of who should decide about the presence of a 
mental illness is not new (6), in fact there has been a “longstand-
ing and widespread concern that,” as Buchanan (7) (p. 19) writes, 
“psychiatric testimony is more likely than other evidence to 
intrude into the jury’s realm.” This was especially relevant regard-
ing the Product test, in which the presence of a mental illness, 
diagnosed by the behavioral expert, appeared to almost imme-
diately result in insanity. This was considered undesirable, and 
in fact a “psychiatrization of criminal law” Gerber (8) (p. 125). 
In the US, the courts do not have to rely on a behavioral expert’s 
advice when deciding about mental abnormality, as Morse (9) 
(p. 894, references omitted) explains:
“The criminal law can, but need not, turn to scientific or clinical 
definitions of mental abnormality as legal criteria when prom-
ulgating mental health laws. The Supreme Court has reiterated 
on numerous occasions that there is substantial dispute within 
the mental health professions about diagnoses, that psychiatry 
is not an exact science, and that the law is not bound by extra-
legal professional criteria. The law often uses technical terms, 
such as ‘mental disorder,’ or semi-technical qualifiers, such as 
‘severe,’ but non-technical terms, such as ‘mental abnormality,’ 
have also been approved. Legal criteria are adopted to answer 
legal questions. As long as they plausibly do so, they will be 
approved even if they are not psychiatric or psychological 
criteria.”
Yet, what is interesting about the case we present is that the 
court did turn to behavioral experts, but when the latter were 
unable to diagnose a disorder, the Court nevertheless decided that 
there was a mental disorder. In fact, the Court then decided to 
impose the most far-reaching measure for forensic care possible 
in the Netherlands: TBS (see below).
The outline of the paper is as follows. First, we will further, but 
briefly, introduce the Dutch legal system regarding psychiatric 
and psychological evaluations of defendants (see Behavioral 
Assessment of Defendants in the Netherlands). Next, in Section 
“The Case: The Court of Appeal, and the ECtHR,” we present the 
Dutch case and we look at it in some detail (because the legal 
details matter), focusing on the Dutch Court of Appeal decision 
and the ECtRH. In Section “Analysis and Discussion,” we discuss 
the decisions.
BeHaVioraL assessMent oF 
deFendants in tHe netHerLands
According to article 39 of the Dutch Criminal Code, anyone 
who commits an offense for which he cannot be held responsible 
due to a mental defect or mental disease is not punishable (5, 6, 
10–12).2 To come to this decision, the trial judge—who does not 
have the expertise to assess a mental disorder of the defendant 
and its relation to the offense—needs to obtain information from 
a behavioral expert, usually a psychologist or psychiatrist. This 
expert advice pro Justitia is even a statutory requirement if the 
judge considers imposing a placement in a psychiatric hospital 
(plaatsing in een psychiatrisch ziekenhuis) or a hospital order 
(terbeschikkingstelling, TBS), a criminal measure similar to the 
commitment order which can be imposed in the US (cf. article 
330.20 lid 1 sub f New York Criminal Procedure Law). The expert 
advice is an important substantive safeguard with respect to the 
assessment by the judge of the defendant’s insanity or (dimin-
ished) responsibility.
As mentioned earlier, TBS is the most severe measure. This 
security measure can be imposed if the defendant, at the time of 
committing the (grave) offense, was suffering from a mental defect 
or mental disease. If the offense was directed against the physical 
integrity of the victim, the TBS can be extended every 2 years. 
In recent years, it has become more common for defendants not 
to cooperate with psychiatric and psychological evaluations, 
presumably because they fear the indeterminacy of the duration 
of TBS (and their lawyers may advice against cooperation for that 
reason). The defendant is free either to cooperate or not (5, 6). 
In recent years, there have been quite a few cases in which the 
behavioral experts were not able to do a proper evaluation of the 
defendant, because he did not sufficiently cooperate.3 Behavioral 
experts should not diagnose a person without performing a 
proper evaluation (13). In addition, the nemo tenetur-principle—
one is not obliged to contribute to his own conviction—which 
can be derived from the right to a fair trial (article 6 European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, ECHR), gives the defendant the legal space to refuse to 
cooperate with the behavioral examination (14).
In the daily practice of Dutch criminal law, the judge explicitly 
asks the psychiatrist and psychologist about their opinion with 
regard to insanity or (diminished) criminal responsibility of 
the defendant. This question is part of a format that was used 
over the last decades in Dutch criminal law. Until recently, 
the behavioral expert was supposed to answer—among oth-
ers—the following questions (this is the format of questions used 
in the case we describe):
 1. Is the examined person suffering from a mental disorder/
defective development of the mental faculties? If so, how can 
this be described diagnostically (in terms of the DSM)?
 2. What was the person’s mental condition at the time the crimi-
nal offense was committed?
2 This is our translation of article 39, based on Ref. (10), p. 74: “Anyone who com-
mits an offence for which he cannot be held responsible by reason of a mental 
disorder or mental disease is not criminally liable” cf. (11), p. 295: “section 39 of 
the Dutch Penal Code exempts from punishment the defendant to whom a crime 
cannot be attributed by reason of a mental disorder.”
3 According to section 37 paragraph 3 of the Dutch Criminal Code, a psychiatric 
and psychological evaluation is not required if the defendant refuses to cooperate. 
In such a case, the behavioral experts report—if possible—about the defendant’s 
reason not to cooperate and an advice about the desirability and necessity of a 
security measure must be sought by the judge.
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 3. Did the mental disorder/defective development of the mental 
faculties influence the behavioral choices of the examined 
person, or his behavior during the offense, to an extent that the 
alleged offense can be explained from this disorder/defective 
development?
 4. If so, can the behavioral expert substantiate:
(a) in what way this happened,
(b) to what extent this happened, and
(c) which conclusion with regard to the examined person’s 
criminal responsibility can be advised?4
 5. Can the behavioral expert substantiate to what extent and in 
what way the (possible) mental disorder/defective develop-
ment of the mental faculties could lead to similar or other 
offenses?
The answer to question 4c by the behavioral expert used 
to be categorized in one out of five degrees: (i) responsibility, 
(ii) somewhat diminished responsibility, (iii) diminished respon-
sibility, (iv) severely diminished responsibility, or (v) insanity 
(15, 16). (Currently, in the Netherlands, a three point scale is used: 
(1) responsibility, (2) diminished responsibility, and (3) insanity.)
Another feature of the Dutch system is that there is no formal 
test for legal insanity. As a result of the lack of clarity of the criteria 
for legal insanity, in practice, each behavioral expert creates his 
own frame of reference with regard to this concept (17).
In some recent cases, even though the behavioral expert 
could not establish any diagnosis, the judge nevertheless came 
to the conclusion that the defendant was suffering from a mental 
illness in the legal sense (18). Reversely, in a case in which the 
defendant was reported by a psychologist to be suffering from 
“hyper  sexuality”—which was not described in DSM-IV-TR5 
(Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders)—the 
court of appeal did not impose a TBS measure because the court 
ruled that only mental disorders described in DSM-IV-TR could 
be considered a mental defect or mental disease in the legal sense. 
The Dutch Supreme Court overruled this decision (19). As a con-
sequence, mental diseases that are not described in DSM-IV-TR 
can be considered as a mental defect or mental disease in the legal 
sense. However, as the Supreme Court judged without further 
explanation, the mere fact that a mental disease is described in 
DSM-IV-TR does not necessarily mean that this is a mental ill-
ness in the legal sense.6
4 In the Dutch legal system, the behavioural expert gives explicit advice about 
the level of criminal responsibility. This is not permitted in all legal systems. For 
instance, in the case of Washington v. US (1967) the Court ruled that psychiatrists 
cannot testify on the ultimate issue.
5 At the time of the case, the DSM-IV was used, therefore we refer to the DSM-IV.
6 The DSM-IV-TR (p. xxxii–xxxiii) contains the following cautionary statement 
with regard to the use of DSM in a forensic context: “When the DSM-IV categories, 
criteria, and textual descriptions are employed for forensic purposes, there are 
significant risks that diagnostic information will be misused or misunderstood. 
These dangers arise because of the imperfect fit between the questions of ultimate 
concern to the law and the information contained in a clinical diagnosis. In most 
situations, the clinical diagnosis of a DSM-IV mental disorder is not sufficient to 
establish the existence for legal purposes of a ‘mental disorder,’ ‘mental disability,’ 
‘mental disease,’ or ‘mental defect.’ In determining whether an individual meets a 
specified legal standard (e.g., for competence, criminal responsibility, or disability), 
additional information is usually required beyond that contained in the DSM-IV 
diagnosis.”
With regard to the question of whether a TBS measure should 
be imposed, it is for the judge to decide whether the defendant 
was suffering from a mental illness at the time the offense was 
committed. According to the jurisprudence of the Supreme 
Court, the judge has his own responsibility with respect to 
this assessment and the judge is not restrained by the advice of 
behavioral experts (20).
One of the core activities of the judiciary is the interpretation of 
the (statutory) law. If security measures can be imposed to offenders 
who, according to the law, suffer from “a mental defect or mental 
disease,” it is up to the judge to interpret this legal term. The lack of 
a legal standard in this regard complicates this interpretation. The 
interpretation of the legal term “a mental defect or mental disease” 
should be distinguished from the question of whether the defend-
ant actually suffers from a mental defect or disease.
tHe Case: tHe CoUrt oF appeaL,  
and tHe eCtHr
In a famous Dutch case—the Hoogerheide case—the defendant 
was convicted to 12 years imprisonment and TBS for manslaugh-
ter of an 8-year-old boy on 1 December 2006 (18). Because the 
precise legal reasoning is important to our argument, in this sec-
tion, we provide some crucial quotations from the Court rulings 
which will be discussed in the next section. The Dutch Court of 
Appeal judged as follows:
“If, as in the present case, the suspect has withheld his (complete) 
cooperation in an examination by behavioral experts, then the 
requirement of a (full) multidisciplinary examination within 
the meaning of Article 37 § 2 of the Criminal Code disappears.7  
But the need remains for the establishment of a mental disturbance 
or inadequate development of the suspect’s mental faculties at the 
time when he committed the act. Without it, a TBS order cannot 
be imposed. It is up to the trial court to make that establishment. 
The trial court will have to let itself be guided to a very considerable 
extent by the findings and conclusions of behavioral experts, when 
the behavioral experts reach the limits of what they can take respon-
sibility for within their scientific knowledge, the trial court will have 
to take its own responsibility in so far as the law gives it the necessary 
room. Neither statute nor case-law requires the disturbance to be 
classified according to the DSM-IV manual and determined by a 
behavioral expert. This means that, contrary to what the defense has 
argued, it is ultimately for the trial court, obviously with great cau-
tion, to establish the existence of a mental disturbance, even though 
the behavioral experts cannot reach that conclusion based on the 
scientific criteria and deontological standards applicable to them. 
The trial court will, however, have to find sufficient support for 
its decision in what the behavioral experts may have been able to 
establish and whatever other facts and circumstances may have 
become apparent to the trial court regarding the person of the 
suspect (21).”
7 The Court of Appeal apparently refers to article 37 § 3 of the Criminal 
Code, according to the first line of which the second paragraph of article 37 
is not applicable if the defendant refuses to cooperate with the behavioral 
examination.
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In considering the defendant’s mental state, the Court of 
Appeal had regard to the following [quotation from Constancia 
(21)]:
 – A report by a psychologist drawn up on 21 March 2004, in 
connection with a prosecution for armed robbery. It was noted 
that the applicant’s personality had not yet matured, so that 
it was not yet possible to find that the applicant was afflicted 
with an inadequate development of his mental faculties in the 
sense of a personality disorder. The applicant’s personality 
was characterized by an inadequate sense of values, a lack of 
fear as an inhibiting factor, impulsiveness and a tendency to 
overestimate himself and overlook his limitations. The danger 
of reoffending was considered real. The applicant’s personal-
ity development was under threat and there was a danger of 
further personality distortion.
 – A report by a forensic psychiatrist drawn up on 4 December 
2006. This reflected that the applicant behaved as if nothing 
could affect him and pictured himself above the situation in 
which he found himself as a homicide suspect; it also related 
some “bizarre statements” reflecting disturbed reality testing.
 – A report drawn up on 21 June 2007 by a psychologist and a 
psychiatrist (…). It is noted that the applicant was diagnosed 
with a “borderline syndrome” at the age of 15 and with an 
“as yet immature personality with narcissistic and antisocial 
traits” at the age of 19. The report posited narcissistic and anti-
social personality disorders, identity problems, and psychotic 
episodes such as would indicate the so-called borderline per-
sonality, but a schizophrenic development was not excluded. 
The applicant’s refusal to cooperate had made it impossible, 
however, to draw any definite conclusions.
 – A supplementary report drawn up on 27 January 2011 by 
[court appointed behavioral experts] psychologist O. and 
psychiatrist R. Based on all the information available, includ-
ing the criminal file and the audio and audio-visual recordings 
of interrogations, this reflected the “worrying development” of 
a young man who had led a detached and antisocial existence, 
had abused cannabis, and lived in a world of his own. As the 
report itself mentions, this was, in effect, the same finding as 
that made in 2007. The experts O. and R. were unable to sup-
plement it with findings resulting from their own observation.8
In addition, the Court of Appeal made use of statements of 
witnesses, some of them close relatives of the applicant, and of 
reports by police and prison staff made after the applicant’s arrest. 
All described the applicant as manifesting unusual behavior. The 
Court of Appeal came to the conclusion that the defendant’s 
responsibility for the offense was diminished due to mental 
8 For several weeks, the defendant has been under observation in a specialized 
observation clinic, Pieter Baan Center, Utrecht, The Netherlands. From a meth-
odological point of view, if a defendant is not collaborating but he is in custody, 
an expert might setup an observation setting, and triangulate the ensuing findings 
with file data. This might yield relevant information for establishing a mental 
disorder. Yet, what is important in our paper is the Court’s response to the fact 
that the experts were unable to establish the presence of a mental illness. How the 
presence can be established by behavioral experts is another matter and may also 
depend on the legal system.
disturbance. Since diminished responsibility did not exclude 
the defendant’s accountability completely, the Court of Appeal 
imposed not only a TBS measure but also a prison sentence.
This judgment was upheld by the Dutch Supreme Court 
(22). The convicted person started proceedings at the ECtHR, 
complaining that the TBS measure had been imposed without 
objective medical expertise to support it, thus violating article 5 § 
1 (e) of the ECHR, which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. 
No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following 
cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law: 
(…) (e) the lawful detention (…) of persons of unsound mind.”
The ECtHR judged as follows:
‘25. The Court reiterates its established case-law according to which 
an individual cannot be considered to be of “unsound mind” 
and deprived of his or her liberty unless the following three 
minimum conditions are satisfied: first, he or she must reliably 
be shown to be of unsound mind, that is to say, a true mental 
disorder must be established before a competent authority on 
the basis of objective medical expertise; second, the mental 
disorder must be of a kind or degree warranting compulsory 
confinement; third, the validity of continued confinement 
depends upon the persistence of such a disorder (…).
26. Where no other possibility exists, for instance, because of 
a refusal of the person concerned to appear for an exami-
nation, at least an assessment by a medical expert on the 
basis of the file must be sought, failing which it cannot be 
maintained that the person has reliably been shown to be of 
unsound mind (…). Furthermore, the medical assessment 
must be based on the actual state of mental health of the 
person concerned and not solely on past events (…).
27. In deciding whether an individual should be detained as a 
“person of unsound mind,” the national authorities are to 
be recognized as having a certain discretion since it is in the 
first place for them to evaluate the evidence adduced before 
them in a particular case; the Court’s task is to review under 
the Convention the decisions of those authorities (…).
30. Turning to the facts of the case, the Court notes that the 
Arnhem Court of Appeal had recourse to a plurality of 
reports of earlier examinations of the applicant by psychia-
trists and psychologists as well as a report by a psychologist 
and a psychiatrist commissioned while the proceedings were 
pending before it based on the criminal file and the audio 
and audio-visual recordings of interrogations. Although 
the various psychiatrists and psychologists were unable 
to establish a precise diagnosis, they did express the view 
that the applicant was severely disturbed, which view the 
Court of Appeal found reinforced by its own investigation 
of the case file, of the applicant’s own confused statements 
especially (…). The Court accepts that, faced as it was 
with the applicant’s complete refusal to cooperate in any 
examination of his mental state at any relevant time, the 
Court of Appeal was entitled to conclude from the informa-
tion thus obtained that the applicant was suffering from a 
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genuine mental disorder which, whatever its precise nature 
might be, was of a kind or degree warranting compulsory 
confinement.’
anaLysis and disCUssion
Several issues are relevant here. First of all, it is important to 
consider what has been said about the use of the DSM clas-
sification. In daily practice of behavioral experts, psychiatrists 
may or may not use the DSM Manual. For instance, an alterna-
tive classification is the International Classification of Diseases 
(ICD classification), which is used in many countries, among 
which European countries, such as France and Sweden. The 
fact that a DSM classification would not be decisive for the 
assessment of a mental disease or mental defect should, there-
fore, be distinguished from a statement that it does not have 
to be the behavioral expert who diagnoses the disorder. The 
profession of psychiatry as an international medical discipline 
cannot be equated with the DSM classification. Consequently, 
the—valid—opinion that DSM classification is not decisive 
does not by itself imply that psychiatric expertise would not 
be decisive when it comes down to the assessment of a mental 
illness.
Suppose that without a diagnosis by a psychiatrist and without 
any other (previous) findings of behavioral experts with regard 
to the mental capacities of the defendant, the judge would, nev-
ertheless, impose a TBS measure. The TBS setting is a forensic 
psychiatric setting, in which psychiatrists and psychologists 
work. They determine the plans of treatment and intervention. 
If the defendant would be admitted to a psychiatric hospital 
without an underlying diagnosis by a psychiatrist, there might 
be no valid point of departure for an adequate treatment since no 
psychiatric disorder was established by the (behavioral) expert 
in this respect. In other words, there is an inconsistency in the 
legal reasoning if at some point the disorder is “legal” in nature 
(and psychiatrists and psychologists were unable to diagnose 
a disorder), and at another point the person is admitted to a 
psychiatric hospital (5, 6).
Furthermore, without an underlying opinion of a behavioral 
expert about the mental capacities of the defendant, the judge 
who would nevertheless establish a psychiatric illness would not 
be able to specify the disorder. The judge would rule that the 
criminal responsibility was reduced without explaining how the 
disorder influences the behavior. Such a legal argument makes 
it very difficult for a defendant to challenge the court’s decision. 
How to appeal against such a line of reasoning? What is the 
framework against which the judge comes to his conclusion, 
and is this sufficiently clear for the defendant to contest such a 
conclusion? This is remarkable since, as is clear from the format 
of questions, such an explanation is required from Dutch behav-
ioral experts: experts should detail the way in which a mental 
illness impacted on the defendant’s behavior at the time of the 
crime, and base their judgment of legal insanity (or diminished 
responsibility) on such an analysis.
One should bear in mind that the law specifically requires 
that a psychiatrist and a psychologist write a report about the 
defendant before a TBS measure can be imposed by a court. This 
strongly suggests, in our view, that the behavioral experts’ judg-
ment and advice are very important safeguards here. The way in 
which this requirement is now interpreted is that a psychiatrist 
and psychologist should try to perform an evaluation and even if 
they were not able to do that, they can still write a report detail-
ing what they tried, and that they cannot come to a judgment or 
advice in terms of criminal responsibility and sanctions which 
might be imposed by the judge. Clearly in cases in which the 
behavioral experts disagree, the court may, e.g., choose one of the 
reports, or ask for a third opinion. This situation, however, differs 
from cases in which psychiatrists and psychologists are unable 
to diagnose a disorder whatsoever.
Finally, we would like to draw attention to one specific element 
of the ECtHR judgment, which reads: “Although the various 
psychiatrists and psychologists were unable to establish a precise 
diagnosis” (23)—while in fact the behavioral experts did not 
establish any diagnosis. What would be an example of a diagnosis 
that was “not precise”? Perhaps, an example could be: the defend-
ant was psychotic, but, due to lack of information, the experts 
are unable to determine the precise nature of the psychosis, e.g., 
whether it was a psychosis within the context of schizophrenia, 
bipolar disorder, depression, or substance abuse (all these condi-
tions may lead to/be accompanied by a psychosis). In this case, 
however, the experts clearly stayed away from making a diagno-
sis. Furthermore, the ECtHR says that the experts “did express 
the view that the applicant was severely disturbed.” But does this 
truly reflect that the experts said that “based on all the informa-
tion available (…) this reflected the ‘worrying development’ of a 
young man who had led a detached and antisocial existence, had 
abused cannabis, and lived in a world of his own (…). The experts 
O. and R. were unable to supplement it with findings resulting 
from their own observation”? With its interpretation, the ECtHR 
somehow appears to overstate what the experts actually reported. 
In any case, the experts did not explicitly testify: “Even though we 
are not able to establish a precise diagnosis, in our opinion this 
defendant is severely disturbed.”
We believe that the criterion of “a true mental disorder must 
be established before a competent authority on the basis of objec-
tive medical expertise” is an important safeguard, and if a “true 
mental disorder” cannot be established on the basis of “objective 
medical expertise”—which is psychiatric expertise by nature, not 
legal expertise—this should have consequences, independent of 
the reason why a “true mental disorder” could not be established. 
In fact, this is exactly what the ECtHR formulated: “Where no 
other possibility exists, for instance, because of a refusal of the 
person concerned to appear for an examination, at least an 
assessment by a medical expert on the basis of the file must be 
sought, failing which it cannot be maintained that the person has 
reliably been shown to be of unsound mind (…). Furthermore, 
the medical assessment must be based on the actual state of 
mental health of the person concerned and not solely on past 
events.” We feel that these words provide clear guidance. It is now 
up to the judiciary—including the ECtHR itself—to live up to 
these words.
In our opinion, the boundaries of the disciplines of the judi-
ciary and behavioral experts, respectively, should not be crossed 
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by one another.9 If behavioral experts cannot reach the conclu-
sion—based on their own research and/or based on previous 
behavioral examinations of the defendant—that the defendant 
suffers from a mental disease or mental defect, the judge should 
refrain from an assessment that the defendant nevertheless suf-
fers from a psychiatric illness. The consequence of this line of 
reasoning is that the judge would indeed be limited with regard 
to the possibilities of disposal of the criminal case. In case of 
conviction of the defendant, the judge could not impose a TBS 
measure. A long(er) imprisonment by way of retribution might 
be a serious option for a judge.
ConCLUsion
Legal insanity is a peculiar element of criminal law, because it 
brings together two very different disciplines: psychiatry and 
psychology on the one hand and the law on the other. We con-
clude that it is crucial—for instance, in terms of legal certainty 
of (potential) defendants—to clearly distinguish between the 
9 Confronting scientific and legal criteria in real forensic cases does not only concern 
the insanity assessment but, at least potentially, also many other kinds of evalua-
tions requested by Courts to psychiatrists and psychologists (e.g., eyewitnesses’ 
reliability, honest confessions, and suggestibility). Yet, we focus on establishing the 
presence of a mental illness in a defendant. See also AR Mackor (24).
responsibilities of the behavioral expert on the one hand and 
the court on the other. Establishing the presence of a mental 
illness is an expert’s responsibility which can have far-reaching 
consequences with regard to the decision of the court concern-
ing the imposition of criminal sanctions. Clearly, if the experts 
disagree, the court has to make a final judgment, but also within 
the boundaries of the objective medical expertise presented to 
the court. We provided several reasons for this position. One 
who we would like to emphasize is that the defendant should 
be able to challenge the court’s decision, and therefore the way 
in which a mental illness is established should be transparent. 
The ECtHR has provided a valuable legal framework in this 
respect, relevant to all legal systems falling under its jurisdiction. 
Its own decision regarding the case we presented, however, seems 
to depart from that framework. The relevance of the case we 
presented is, however, not limited to European countries. More 
generally, it is crucial that legal decisions about a defendant’s ill-
ness are founded on the right grounds, in particular where they 
have far-reaching legal consequences.
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